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May 7, 1975
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

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EAST ASIA

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CONTENTS

May 7, 1975

SOUTHEAST ASIA

[redacted] 25X1

Indonesia's Army: Diversity in Unity. 7

[redacted] 25X1

NORTH ASIA

South Korea: Pak Bears Down on Opponents. . . . 14

Japan: The New Indochina Debate 19

Japan - South Korea: Potential for Trouble. . . 21 25X1

[redacted]

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000900160001-6

25X1A

Indonesia's Army: Diversity in Unity

Indonesia's political stability over the short term depends on the cohesion of the Indonesian army which controls the major instruments of national, political, and economic life. Student discontent, urban unemployment, rural economic dislocation, and rampant corruption are symptoms of fundamental problems that may in time produce social and political upheaval. Signs of disunity or loss of confidence among the army leadership would hasten the day, and President Suharto and the generals who advise him are acutely aware of this.

Thus far, army leaders have been able to compose their differences and unite behind Suharto when the situation requires, as they did after the urban riots of January 1974. Such unity, however, depends on agreement among most of the army that a potential threat to its rule exists and that Suharto represents the army's best hope for preserving its interests. More importantly, there must be general consensus on what the army's overriding interests are and what methods are best for preserving them.

The Past as Prologue

The present day Indonesian army developed from a collection of autonomous regional units that fought the Dutch between 1945 and 1949. This inheritance resulted in a national army that had weak command-and-control mechanisms and whose regional commanders had large amounts of power based on their alliances with local political and commercial interests. At the same time, however, the post-revolution army had a sense of corporate identity as the winner of independence, and few of its members had ties to the competing national civilian political groups.

During the Sukarno years, rivalry within the military, based on ethnic and religious differences as well as service and unit loyalties, helped weaken the army as a political force and often allowed the former president to ignore his generals' desires. In addition to its institutional weaknesses in competing for influence under Sukarno, the army was unable to devise a convincing, integrated vision of its role in Indonesian society, and none of Sukarno's various ideological formulae recognized the army as an independent component.

During the early 1960s, the high command gradually became more unified. After the unsuccessful regional revolts of 1957-58, most non-Javanese officers were eliminated from the army, bringing a new ethnic homogeneity to the officer corps. Javanese dominance of the army councils, however, exacerbated competition between the three Java-based divisions.

The army's sense of itself as an elite body with a mission was also intensified by the beginning of a philosophy that depicted the army as the embodiment of the 1945 revolution and of Indonesia's national ethos. The army's position in society was enhanced when Sukarno began choosing military men to fill top civil service posts and to run nationalized foreign enterprises. Reorganization of the territorial command system and other institutional changes chipped away at the autonomy of regional army commanders.

Centralization under Suharto

Sukarno's political downfall after the abortive communist coup of September 1965 and the subsequent rise to power of General Suharto put the army command in full control of its destiny for the first time. From the beginning, Suharto stressed the need for a full-scale reorganization that would guarantee defense ministry control over the military, army control over

the defense ministry, and Suharto's personal control over the army. The military reorganization which followed greatly enhanced the power of the commander in chief at the expense of all other elements. Regional officers in particular lost their former freedom of action and, in addition, they are now rotated frequently to prevent the entrenchment of local warlords. Improved communications from Jakarta have contributed greatly to the defense ministry's new ability to keep close watch over local army affairs.

Army leaders have not neglected the need for ideological unity. The various military schools and training courses now provide large doses of an all-encompassing philosophy that focuses on the army as the true embodiment of the national ideology, Pancasila. Instructors also stress professionalism and mastery of the military arts. In this way, they hope to create a self-conscious elite group free of the kinds of rivalries that plagued the army in the past.

Such institutional and ideological measures contribute to cohesion largely in the middle and lower ranks and among the younger generation of officers. For the generals who run the country, the most significant force for unity is their shared belief that disunity will lead to political chaos that could in turn open the way for a resurgence of leftist political activity. The generals lived through the Sukarno era and remember how their civilian rivals exploited intra-army competition. In 1973, widespread belief that dissension existed within the top army leadership undoubtedly contributed to the rapid spread of a civilian protest movement. The ease with which the small-scale student demonstrations of late 1973 blossomed into widespread urban violence in Jakarta in January 1974 was interpreted by Suharto and others as an object lesson in the political perils of army disunity.

These concerns work to Suharto's political advantage. Private and public expressions of independent

thinking or criticism of government acts have been consistently discouraged in Suharto's army. Since assuming power in 1967, Suharto has picked off his opponents and rivals one by one, enforcing conformity on recalcitrant generals; otherwise they are exiled to powerless high prestige jobs or forced into retirement. As a result, Suharto has gradually evolved from the first among equals to something more closely approaching authoritarian control. It also works to Suharto's advantage that even those who might oppose his leadership could not agree among themselves on a satisfactory substitute.

Intimations of Mortality

Despite the public display of consensus and the ideological and institutional changes, competing cliques still exist. Evidence of disunity in late 1973, while it should not be overstated, nonetheless demonstrated that there are important chinks in the public facade. The ostentatious closing of the ranks in the spring of 1974, although impressive, did not resolve any of these fundamental problems. Present army leaders belong to the same generation that won the revolution, and loyalties to revolutionary comrades, territorial units and ethno-religious identities are still important to them. Moreover, there is a new built-in tension created by the army's added role as a government--the cleavage between those primarily responsible for its military-security duties and those dealing with the civilian-administrative tasks.

Most of Suharto's efforts to create a unified army have been directed at disunity arising within the army as a military institution. Since 1965, however, the army has operated as much as a political party as an army--perhaps more so. Army generals spend more time discussing national political and economic strategies

than defense problems. As with any civilian political party, such amorphous issues easily give rise to factions based on personalities, interest groups, and differences over goals and methods. Differences over how the Suharto government was handling civilian discontent, for example, contributed to army disunity in late 1973.

A new split based on different military generations is a growing possibility. The top ranks are filled with those whose careers are based on revolutionary trial by combat in 1945, while the younger officers are being judged against new standards of professional competence. Although the evidence is fragmentary, this schism may be reinforced by the new nationalist ideology being taught in the academies. The younger men are being taught that the army's role is nation building, whereas many of the older men in positions of responsibility seem more bent on self-gratification. It is not inconceivable that such a split could give rise to a "colonels' reform movement" within the army, perhaps with ties to civilian opponents of the regime.

Another potential source of disunity is the numerous army leaders who, over the years since 1965, have been forced out of the ruling group. Some of them represented important groups within the army that may now feel bereft of a voice in decision making.

Over the short term, however, the main factor affecting continued military cohesion will probably be whether the generals' historic memory of past consequences of disunity will continue to override their personal and philosophical differences. A showdown was avoided in 1974 because General Sumitro and his friends chose not to contest Suharto's decision to remove Sumitro from power, but there is no guarantee that future protagonists will follow suit. [redacted] 25X1

May 7, 1975

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000900160001-6

South Korea: Pak Bears Down on Opponents

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President Pak of South Korea is citing an increased threat of attack from the North as justification for cracking down on his domestic opposition.

Over the past several weeks, the Pak government has executed eight political prisoners, sent troops to occupy one major university, closed down many others, passed an "anti-slander" law curbing political dissent, arrested a number of political opponents, and expelled an American missionary who had been critical of the regime.

Pak reportedly is planning other steps to control former political prisoners and to restrict what he terms "left-wing" organizational work among the urban poor and in labor unions by Christian leaders.

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This tougher approach reflects, in part, Pak's disappointment with the conciliatory tactics he tried last winter--the staged national referendum and the release of some 150 prisoners. These gestures took the steam out of the anti-Pak movement for a time, but opposition politicians soon began to speak out again, and university students went ahead with their customary spring demonstrations.

The President's inclination to get tough has been reinforced by developments in Indochina and by the recent trip of Kim Il-song to Peking. Pak says these events increase the threat of attack from the North. Although obviously dramatizing this threat to justify suppression of criticism, he does seem alert to the danger of overdoing it. In a major address on

April 29, for example, he emphasized that the threat from the North should not be overestimated.

Pak is aware that a domestic crackdown may lead to diminished support in the US Congress. He seems, nevertheless, to have decided that the need for stricter discipline--demanded by national security--is worth the risk, that he will never be able to satisfy his critics in the US, and that to attempt it would undermine his position.

Major Problems

Pak is convinced that unquestioning acceptance of his leadership is necessary if South Korea is to meet the challenge of the tightly disciplined North Korea. South Korean society, however, has changed greatly with the economic achievements fostered over the past 15 years by his own administration. The educated, largely Westernized, urban middle class is no longer willing to accept strong man rule. More and more members of this elite are demanding an open system, more citizen participation in government, and greater opportunities for political and economic change.

Many in the opposition share Pak's concern about North Korean intentions, but they argue that Pak's political views are the greater danger to South Korea. In their view, his increasingly unpopular system, maintained in large measure by police-state methods, dilutes national unity and weakens the nation's ability to stand up to the communists.

The new constitution that Pak pushed through in a 1972 referendum has become the major target of the opposition, which objects particularly to provisions that virtually guarantee Pak the presidency for life. The opposition demands changes that would provide for genuine elections for the presidency and the national legislature.

Pak faces a number of other potentially serious problems:

--There are few in the government hierarchy these days with the temerity to question Pak's judgments and decisions. He thus acts with limited information.

--Pak has no ally other than the US to whom he can turn, and indications of concern in the US about violations of civil rights encourage his opponents to believe they might win US support for their positions.

--Some South Korean military and security leaders believe that government troops and police might refuse to fire on anti-Pak demonstrators if the chaotic pattern of the 1960 anti-Rhee riots is repeated.

--Pak faces difficult economic problems. The South Korean economy depends greatly on exports, hit hard over the past year by recession in the industrialized states. The government is concerned that steep inflation and rising unemployment in key export industries could at some point bring the largely apolitical urban labor force into active opposition.

Assets

Pak still enjoys some advantages in dealing with his opponents, who are largely concentrated in Seoul and a few other major cities. Most of the top army commanders are loyal to Pak

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Major business interests probably support Pak, although there is some concern that Pak's inability to end demonstrations and unrest could discourage foreign investment. The regime appears strongest in the countryside where the peasants are not doing badly and, in any case, are usually apolitical.

Pak's political shrewdness makes him a tough adversary; under pressure he digs in, intimidating most opponents. Some experienced observers point out that Pak also seems to know when to ease up in order to avoid provoking explosive reactions.

Outlook

Pak has to decide whether to permit constitutional changes that would allow the opposition a legitimate and meaningful role, to continue with the carrot-and-stick tactics of recent years, or to clamp down even harder.

Pak is too wary of his political enemies at home and in the North to let his guard down and to choose the first option.

The third option, which would mean dropping most of the appearances of democracy, seems more likely now than at any time in recent years. Pak may calculate that, in the aftermath of recent events in Indochina, the US will be reluctant to appear to be withholding support from any established ally, regardless of its faults. US congressional attitudes, however, provide some brake on this option.

The outlook is for a continuation of Pak's carrot-and-stick policies--an essentially hard domestic line, with an occasional olive branch for the opposition. This will bring Pak into open conflict, sometimes in the streets and on the nation's campuses, with South Korea's nascent middle class. The opposition will try to keep the pressure on, despite repression.

May 7, 1975

Pak's authority, however, probably will not be significantly impaired as long as he is able to avoid a sharp deterioration in the country's economic and security conditions. In the absence of such a decline, the North's opportunities for political subversion will be very limited. [redacted] 25X1

May 7, 1975

25X1A

Japan: The New Indochina Debate

Events in Indochina are contributing to the ongoing debate in Tokyo regarding Japan's political role in Southeast Asia. Arguments so far have emerged along traditional "hawk-dove" lines.

Those in the ruling conservative party who have been most opposed to the US intervention in Indochina--and to Japan's modest role in its support--are urging the Miki government to recognize the emergence of "a new Asia." While they do not advocate loosening security ties with the US, they want a policy of positive Japanese cooperation with the communist governments in Indochina, particularly through investment and technological assistance.

Leftist politicians and a major segment of the Japanese media would go further. They claim to see in recent events the end of an era of "Western domination" of Asia. They urge adoption of an "independent" foreign policy for Japan.

On the other hand, those conservatives who through the sixties believed that Japan had little choice but to support the US military effort in Indochina are inclined to underscore the continuing problem of communist expansionism, particularly in neighboring Korea. They advocate not only strengthened ties with the US, but at least some improvement of Japan's own defense capabilities.

Top Foreign Ministry officials, for their part, are stressing the need for closer security ties with the US. Their remarks indicate no broad policy shifts, at least in the immediate future, but the Japanese government will be watching US actions in Asia over the next few months and will be especially sensitive to any evidence of a weakening in the US security commitment to South Korea.

May 7, 1975

As a first step in adjusting to new realities in Indochina, the Japanese government recognized the PRG on May 7, and has offered to recognize the new Khmer government. As for broader changes in its Indochina and Southeast Asian policies, Tokyo will probably want to wait for the dust to settle. It will be watching two sets of external developments--ASEAN's moves toward Hanoi and an anticipated policy debate in Washington on the future US military posture in Asia.

The Japanese have tried for the past several years to coordinate their Indochina moves with the ASEAN grouping, in part to advertise Tokyo's "Asianness" and in part to smooth over any resultant complications in relations with the US. Because they generally approve the ongoing ASEAN effort to offer Hanoi a regional alternative to its alignment with Peking and Moscow, the Japanese will want to coordinate closely on Indochinese affairs with Jakarta and other key ASEAN capitals. [redacted]

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May 7, 1975

25X1A

Japan - South Korea: Potential for Trouble

Relations between Tokyo and Seoul have improved somewhat since their low point in the fall of 1973, but considerable potential for friction remains.

In its first months, the Miki government moved to undo some of the damage done to relations with Seoul during the stewardship of Foreign Minister Kimura, who clearly favored improved ties with Pyongyang. Recently, however, this trend has been arrested because of Tokyo's stalling on scheduling the long-delayed joint ministerial conference and its wrangling over aid to Seoul and Export-Import Bank credits to Pyongyang.

Japan's new coolness has caused some surprise and bitterness in Seoul. The Pak government clearly expected an improvement after it released two Japanese students from prison in February as a goodwill gesture, especially in view of the obvious economic importance of the relationship to both sides.

The harder Japanese line seems to come from Prime Minister Miki himself. During South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo's recent visit to Tokyo, Miki came down hard on the Kim Tae-chung case, which he called a "shadow on the heart of the Japanese people." Miki, to the dismay of some foreign office officials, implied strongly that relations would not improve until the matter had been resolved.

Foreign Minister Miyazawa echoed the theme, asking for a South Korean gesture such as allowing Kim to go abroad for a short time, perhaps to give lectures at a foreign university. Alternately, Tokyo might settle for punishment of Kim Dong-woon, the Korean intelligence official allegedly responsible for the kidnaping.

May 7, 1975

To Seoul, the long-postponed joint ministerial meeting, at which major aid commitments and other bilateral issues are to be discussed, has taken on considerable symbolic value as a bellwether of Japanese-Korean relations. The Koreans are pressing hard for early scheduling, and the Japanese, reflecting their displeasure over the Kim case, continue to drag their feet.

Some aid discussions have gone on at working levels, and Tokyo has just agreed to fund two new projects worth some $80 million. Even so, the discussions have been dragging on for some time, and Seoul believes that the delay is politically motivated.

At the same time, Tokyo has quietly moved ahead with the processing of applications for Export-Import Bank credits for nine additional projects in North Korea--much to the chagrin of the Pak government. Most of the credits are relatively small, but one involves about $60 million for a textile plant. The credits were apparently informally approved under the Tanaka government.

Because of South Korean and American concern, Tokyo apparently intends to put off the textile plant credit. The Japanese claim, however, that approval of the other projects would be difficult to reverse because the goods to be exported are already being manufactured, and because political reaction from the opposition parties and from Pyongyang would be "severe."

Finally, the Miki government has failed to obtain ratification of the Japanese-Korean continental shelf agreement signed and ratified by Seoul last year. Ruling party approval of the treaty was obtained in March, but some feel that Diet ratification should be delayed until the Kim affair is settled and until disputes over territorial jurisdiction are resolved.

May 7, 1975

A Policy Shift?

The hardening of the Miki government's initially conciliatory approach toward Seoul does not seem at this point to portend a basic shift in policy on Korea.

25X1

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Potential for Trouble

Tokyo appears ready to sit tight until Seoul makes some move on the Kim case. Seoul, for its part, seems to have underestimated Japan's concern on this issue, at least until very recently. Possibly, Seoul may now be considering a conciliatory move, despite irritation over what it sees as Japanese "meddling" in an internal affair.

A potentially more serious difficulty may be the ratification of the continental shelf agreement. Seoul is threatening to move ahead with unilateral development of oil resources thought to be present on the shelf, if Tokyo does not ratify the agreement soon. Many ruling party members, as well as others, feel strongly that this would be a "violation of Japanese sovereignty" and could lead to a serious political dispute.

May 7, 1975

The Miki government is pledged to seek ratification in the current session of the Diet, but prospects are uncertain. The Communists and Socialists have already come out against the treaty, and some conservative party members could try to tie the treaty up in committee if satisfaction is not received from Seoul on the Kim case. If ratification is not achieved in this session, Seoul may feel compelled to push ahead unilaterally.

25X1

May 7, 1975

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000900160001-6